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Selective immigration policies set lower barriers to entry for skilled workers. However, simple economic intuition 
suggests that skilled majorities should welcome unskilled immigrants and protect skilled natives. This paper 
studies the voting over a selective policy in a two-country, three-factor model with skilled and unskilled labor, 
endogenous migration decisions, costly border enforcement and aversion to immigration. Results show that 
heterogeneity in capital distribution forces skilled voters to form a coalition with unskilled voters, who become 
pivotal. The voting outcome is therefore biased towards the preferences of the latter, and consists in a selective 
protectionism. Finally, immigration aversion helps to explain why skilled majorities do not bring down entry 
barriers against unskilled workers. 
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Decisions over immigration policy are a major issue for the developed countries.
Aggregate shocks -such as regional conﬂicts and long-term climate changes- and
persistent wage diﬀerentials foster both constrained and voluntary migration.
In several European countries the importance of immigration aversion is in-
creasing1, and democracies respond to this shift in the voters’ preferences by a
stricter border enforcements (Boeri and Bruecker, 2005).
A well developed literature is concerned with voting over immigration re-
striction: examples include the seminal contribution by Benhabib (1996) and,
more recently, Ortega (2005). Nonetheless, the study of selective immigration
policies as a result of a voting process has received comparatively little attention.
A selective immigration policy is a scheme that establishes diﬀerent quotas
for skilled and unskilled workers. Facchini and Willmann (2005) determine
immigration quotas in a common agency model. This paper instead obtains a
selective immigration policy from a vote over the quotas of skilled and unskilled
workers.
Considering two types of work complicates the analysis for diﬀerent reasons:
ﬁrst when two factors are entering (leaving) a country, complementarity makes it
more diﬃcult to predict what happens to wages2. Second, to avoid a substantial
loss in generality, the eﬀect of immigration on capital income must be considered
as well. Third, ﬁnding a Condorcet winner (henceforth CW) in a bidimensional
voting implies increased technical complexity.
Some initial attempts is in this direction have been made by Grether et
al. (2001) and Bilal et al. (2003). They analyse attitudes towards skilled and
unskilled immigration in an economy open to international trade. However, the
attention of these authors is not focused on the selection of a CW, but on the
outcome of a referendum between two alternatives.
When searching for a CW of a vote over immigration, a common drawback
is the inexistence of interior solutions. This carries the counterfactual conse-
quence that voters request either open immigration or no immigration at all
(see Benhabib, 1996; Bilal et al., 2003; Grether et al., 2001; Thum, 2004).
Ortega (2005) achieves interior solutions in an OLG model with intergener-
ational altruism without bequests where voters anticipate the eﬀects of current
immigration on the future policies.
More generally within a voting model interior solutions emerge if we take into
account a cost of enforcing the border. Such a cost would be -for examplefund-
ing an Immigration Department and frontier stations, creating the necessary
databases, detecting and repatriating the illegal immigrants, and so on.
In spite of their importance, these costs are seldom considered3. Examples
1In the recent elections for the European Parliament, anti-immigration parties made sig-
niﬁcant gains in the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, UK
and Finland.
2Ottaviano and Peri (2011 and 2008) clarify why complementarity is crucial to explain the
unexpectedly low eﬀects of immigration on wages.
3Ethier (1986) stresses that border enforcement "requires real resources". See also Epstein
2where they are considered include Stark et al. (2009), Bosi et al. (2008), Magris
and Russo (2005). In this paper, the costs associated to the enforcement of a
restrictive immigration policy are funded through a ﬂat tax on total income.
Compelling economic intuition suggests that skilled, well-educated majorities
should welcome unskilled immigration (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2008), whereas
entry barriers are expected for skilled workers. Selective policies however, work
in the opposite direction, though they are adopted by destination countries with
skilled majorities (OECD, 2007; Table A1.2a)4.
The results of this paper suggest that such an outcome appears when, though
the majority of the population is skilled, a CW emerges only by aggregating a
coalition where unskilled voters are pivotal. The heterogeneity of the capital
distribution turns out to be crucial in this respect.
On the other hand, a coalition is not necessary when skilled majorities decide
over unskilled immigration. However, since entry of unskilled workers is even
more restricted, in what follows we are going to argue that non-economic factors
are also relevant in the voting process.
Here it is important to recall the overwhelming empirical evidence prov-
ing that preferences over immigration depend crucially on several sociocultural
factors, including concerns for preserving the national culture, the traditional
religion, or feelings of increased insecurity5.
Dustmann and Preston (2007) ﬁnd that racial discrimination is the most
important factor to explain opposition to immigration in the U.K.; Hainmueller
and Hiscox (2007), after studying a 22-country survey, argue that views on
immigration are shaped only by education and have very little connection with
labour market concerns.
Usually however, results are less drastic: both economic competition and
cultural factors matter. O’ Rourke and Sinnott (2006), using survey evidence for
24 countries, show that attitudes towards immigration are aﬀected by economic
interest and nationalist sentiments. Similar outcomes are reported in Scheve
and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), Hanson et al. (2007).
A revealing case is the immigration policy adopted in Switzerland in 1991,
the so-called "three-circle system": under this system, work permits were granted
according to cultural proximity. In practice, permits were assigned preferentially
to EU citizens, then to citizens of particular countries considered traditional mi-
gration partners of Switzerland, and ﬁnally to citizens from the rest of the world
(Miguet, 2008).
and Weiss (2001); Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001). In Italy, the costs associated to the
management of immigration ﬂows were approximately 145 million euros in 2004 and 206
million euros in 2003 (Chiarotti and Martelli, 2005).
4In this paper, a worker is considered skilled when she holds at least an upper secondary
level diploma. This corresponds to level 3 of the International Standard Classiﬁcation of
Education, and requires 12 years of education on average. This is the standard deﬁnition in
the literature (see Steedman and MacIntosh, 2001, and Hanson et al., 2007).
5According to a poll, in April 2007 34.6% of Italians considered immigration as a threat
to the national identity. In 2005, the ﬁgure was 26.6%. Similarly, the share claiming that
immigration is a threat to security and public order increased from 39.2% (2005) to 43.2%
(april 2007). La Repubblica, 05/06/2007.
3Despite the empirical evidence, the eﬀects of immigration aversion have re-
ceived relatively little attention in models.
Some authors introduce cultural preferences in formal migration models. In
Schiﬀ (2002) immigration aﬀects the social capital: people are assumed to derive
utility from living in a culturally homogeneous society, with a well-deﬁned sense
of national identity.
In Hansen (2003) the natives dislike immigration and immigrants choose
their destination based on a measure of cultural distance.
The model presented here is in this respect similar to Hansen (2003): native
voters are averse to immigration, and immigrants show a home-bias in their
utility.
It is possible to conjecture that for skilled workers in particular, immigration
aversion is due to concerns about the eﬀect of unskilled immigration on the rising
cost of the ﬁscal transfers. Hanson et al. (2007) ﬁnd support for this hypothesis
in the U. S6.
Although such considerations are important, it is unlikely that they are the
only explanation of immigration aversion, since immigrants have the conﬂicting
eﬀects on the public budget. While they can be a burden in the short run,
in the long run they can support social security systems put under pressure
by population ageing (Storesletten, 2000; Bonin et al., 2000; Razin and Sadka,
1999).
The conditions required for the ﬁscal leakage to oﬀset the potential gains
are restrictive, and the related evidence is mixed. According to Borjas (1994)
"accounting exercises that assign a dollar value to the tax burden imposed
by immigration inevitably incorporate a number of hidden and questionable
assumptions" (see also Razin and Sadka, 2004).
Computing these eﬀects is methodologically diﬃcult, and results depend
strongly on the assumptions made, in particular for the long-run calculations.
Nannestad (2007) concludes that -in the last 15-20 years - relatively low labour
market participation and high unemployment levels made the average immigrant
to European welfare states a net recipient of welfare beneﬁts. Despite that, he
recommends caution in generalizing this conclusion.
Lemos and Portes (2008) exploit a rich database to study the eﬀect of the EU
enlargement in 2004, that caused one of the largest labour inﬂows in the British
history. In spite of the heated public discussions, they ﬁnd little evidence that
immigration contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant unemployment
in the UK.
Hanson et al. (2007) also agree that non-economic considerations contribute
to shape attitudes about immigration because "prejudice and political attitudes
are likely to play a bigger role in policies like immigration in comparison to
policies like trade".
Of course, arguing that selective immigration policies are the result of purely
non-economic concerns would be meaningless. Rather, this paper suggests that,
6They ﬁnd that skilled workers are more likely to oppose immigration in states with gen-
erous public assistance and unemployment beneﬁts.
4when the net ﬁscal eﬀect of immigration is questionable, non-economic factors
become critical in tipping the scales towards immigration restriction.
This holds especially for unskilled immigration that- in spite of its possible
ﬁscal impact- increases the returns to skilled work and capital.
The paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, Sections 2 and 3
describe the characteristics of the destination and of the origin country. Section
4 speciﬁes the properties of the tax paid in order to fund the border enforcement.
Section 5 presents the immigration policy and the formalization of the decision
to migrate. Section 6 studies the individual preferences over immigration quotas,
and Section 7 shows how the selective policy is determined. The conclusions are
summarized in Section 8, and the proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Destination Country
The destination country (henceforth D) includes a given population of skilled
natives (SD) and unskilled natives (UD). Skilled and unskilled immigrants are
denoted by and S and U respectively Each worker is endowed with a unit of
labour supplied inelastically in a competitive labour market. The production
technology is
YD = F ((SD + S),(UD + U),K) (1)
where YD is a homogeneous consumption good. (SD + S), (UD + U), K stand
for skilled labour, unskilled labour, and aggregate capital respectively.
F (S,U,K) has standard features. It exhibits CRS, smooth and strictly con-
cave in all its arguments; moreover, given K, when (UD + U) = (SD + S) the
marginal productivity of the skilled labour is higher than the marginal produc-
tivity of the unskilled labour. This is the reason why S and U are diﬀerent
production factors. Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts: FS,FU,FK
are the marginal productivities.
For simplicity, only skilled workers are endowed with capital. The capital, k,





, with   k > k > 07.   k can be arbitrarily large and k can be arbitrarily
small. The aggregate capital K is thus given by
K =
  ¯ k
k
n(k)kdk (2)
and the total natives of D are
LD = UD + SD = UD +
  ¯ k
k
n(k)dk (3)
7In order to avoid trivial solutions it is assumed that n(k) is not uniform.
53 Origin Country
The Origin country (henceforth O) is also populated by skilled workers (SO)
and unskilled workers (UO). The composition of the workforce (i.e. the rela-
tive shares of skilled and unskilled workers) is exogenous8. For simplicity, we
suppose that in O there is no capital: skilled and unskilled labour are the only
production factors9. Agents living in O also supply inelastically one unit of
labour in a competitive labour market. A homogeneous consumption good YO
is produced out of a CRS technology G((SO − S);(UO − U)) with the same
properties of F(S,U,K), but using only skilled and unskilled labour (S and U
denote, respectively, the emigration of skilled and unskilled work):
YO = G((SO − S),(UO − U)) (4)
Again, partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts: GS,GU are the marginal
productivities.
The population of O before emigration is simply LO = SO + UO.
4 Enforcement tax
A selective immigration policy is a pair (S∗∗,U∗∗), where S∗∗ and U∗∗ stand
for the number of skilled and unskilled immigrants allowed to enter D.
Suppose now, as we have argued in the Introduction, that enforcing the
national border is costly, and that a tax is needed in order to fund any level of
immigration restriction.
For simplicity, we consider a proportional tax 0 ≤ t(S,U) < 1 on the total
income. t(S,U) depicts the tax necessary to enforce the immigration levels
(S,U) and it is deﬁned over S ∈ [0,SO], U ∈ [0,UO].
t(S,U) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in all its arguments. The same holds
for its derivatives, the marginal taxes tU(S,U) and tS(S,U). In addition, it is
assumed that, t(S,U) and its derivatives are invertible in all their arguments10.
8As a consequence of this assumption, the natives of O only decide whether to migrate
or not, and their human capital is taken as given. This shortcut is necessary in order to
focus our attention on the core of the paper, namely the voting process in D. The relatioship
between selective policies and human capital is the hearth of the "brain gain with a brain
drain" literature (see Stark et al., 1997; and, Commander et al., 2004; Magris and Russo,
2009).
9Including capital would complicate the model without relevant gains in generality. Sup-
pose skilled immigrants bring some capital into D: for unskilled voters, skilled immigration
would be even more proﬁtable, and for skilled voters the inﬂow of capital would reduce the
wage loss but also the beneﬁts on the capital income.
10Thus, given any tax level ˜ t = t(˜ S, ˜ U) it is always possible to obtain ˜ S = h(˜ t, ˜ U) and
˜ U = l(˜ t, ˜ S). Analogously, for any ˜ tS = tS(˜ S, ˜ U) it is always possible to obtain ˜ S = m(˜ tS, ˜ U),
˜ U = n(˜ tS, ˜ S) and so on for ˜ tU = tU(˜ S, ˜ U).
6Other simple regularity conditions for t(S,U) are given below:
tU(S,U), tS(S,U) ≤ 0 and bounded (5)
tUU(S,U) > 0; tSS(S,U) > 0 (6)
tUS(S,U) < 0 (7)
t(SO,UO) = 0 (8)
t(0,0) = t0 < 1 (9)
tS(SO,U) = 0 for any U (10)
tU(S,UO) = 0 for any S (11)
Conditions (5) mean that the tax is decreasing in S,U and that the marginal
tax paid to enforce the border is ﬁnite. Conditions (6) impose convexity, and
assure that the marginal tax is maximum in a neighborhood of (0,0). Condition
(7) means that the marginal tax required to curb the entry of one factor is
decreasing as less resources are needed to curb the entry of the other factor.
Condition (8) states that no restriction implies no cost, and condition (9) gives
the (ﬁnite) cost of a perfect border closure. Notice that, since t0 < 1, perfect
border closure is feasible. Condition (10) states that the marginal tax required
in order to control skilled immigration is negligible when entry is open for skilled
workers. Condition (11) is equivalent to condition (10) for unskilled immigrants.
Assumptions (5-11) are quite intuitive and they do not introduce any special
restrictions.
The after-tax income for natives of D is therefore
AS = [FS + FKk](1 − t(S,U)) (skilled voters) (12)
AU = FU(1 − t(S,U)) (unskilled voters) (13)
where FS is the marginal productivity of skilled workers (the skilled wage),
FU the unskilled wage and FKk is the capital income for a capital endowment
k.
5 Immigration Policy and the Emigration Deci-
sion
In this Section we are going to present the decision problem of potential mi-
grants. Individuals have an incentive to leave O when their utility is higher in
D. Human capital is fully transferable from O to D.
It is important now to adopt two simplifying assumptions: D and O cannot
trade, and capital cannot ﬂow from D to O. As a consequence, only migration
causes factor price convergence. These assumptions are of great help in sim-
plifying the algebra and, though substantial, they mirror well-known stylized
facts: wage diﬀerentials are persistent, and capital does not ﬂow towards poor
countries11-in the present framework it would be impossible since G(S,U) does
not use any capital.
11See the classical reference of Lucas (1990).
7An important characteristic of the literature on migrations is the assumption
that consuming at home yields a higher utility. This assumption is essential to
explain why current emigration ﬂows are indeed low, given the existing wage
diﬀerentials. For example, Ramos (1992) shows that only 25% of Puerto Ricans
migrate to the US even though they are entitled to free mobility to the U.S. Ac-
cording to Borjas (1999) this proves that "important non-economic factors help
to restrain migration ﬂows". These restraining factors include the diﬀerences in
language and culture and the psychological costs of entering an alien environ-
ment. Hence, in order to emigrate, workers need a wage diﬀerential suﬃcient
to compensate the non-economic costs of migration.
In the present model, the preference for domestic consumption is denoted by
the parameters θS > 1, θU > 1 for skilled and unskilled workers respectively12.
By using a simple linear representation, it is possible to characterize the
utilities in O and D as follows:
uS (c,θS) =
 
θScO (consumption in O)
cD (consumption in D) (skilled workers) (14)
uU (c,θU) =
 
θUcO (consumption in O)
cD (consumption in D) (unskilled workers)
where cO and cD are, respectively, consumption in O and D.
The model can be described in three steps: (1) Natives vote over a pair of
quotas S∗∗,U∗∗ for skilled and unskilled immigrants; (2) Workers in O observe
the wage diﬀerential and decide whether to migrate to D. This decision produces
a pool of potential migrants; (3) Skilled and unskilled immigrants enter D until
their respective quotas are ﬁlled. If a quota is slack, all applicants are let in; if
a quota is binding, some immigrants are rationed and cannot move.
Individuals decide whether to migrate or not by comparing their utility in
each location
Since we are in a single-period model, consumption coincides with income.
The marginal productivities are FS, FU in D, and GS, GU in O. The net wage
in D is given by the marginal productivity minus the enforcement tax. By using
the linear utility deﬁned in (14), skilled workers migrate until FS(1−t(S,U)) ≥
θSGS, and unskilled workers do so until FU(1 − t(S,U)) ≥ θUGU.
To proceed in our analysis it is necessary to prove that there exists a pair
(ˆ SE, ˆ UE) for which both conditions hold.
In other words, we are searching for a solution to
 
FS(1 − t(S,U)) ≥ θSGS
FU(1 − t(S,U)) ≥ θUGU
(15)
s.t. S ≤ S∗∗; U ≤ U∗∗
Each inequality means that emigration towards D continues until the utility
of consuming in D weakly dominates the utility of consuming in O.
12It is possible to introduce heterogeneity in θS, θU. However, this does not alter the results,
despite the increased analytic diﬃculty.
8Since the system of inequalities in (15) admits locally unique solutions, it is
possible to introduce the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 When quotas are not binding, the system of inequalities (15) admits
locally unique solutions [ˆ SE, ˆ UE]. When the quota S∗∗ is binding, there exist
locally unique solutions [S∗∗, ˆ UE]; when the quota U∗∗ is binding, there exist
locally unique solutions [ˆ SE,U∗∗]. When both quotas are binding the unique
solution is [S∗∗,U∗∗].
Proof. See the Appendix.
This Lemma is important because it ensures the existence of mutually com-
patible emigration levels for both production factors. Quotas do not hinder the
existence of the equilibrium. Indeed when the stock of potential immigrants
is overwhelming they assure uniqueness, which seems the most likely case for
practical contingencies. The rest of the paper is devoted to showing how the
quotas [S∗∗,U∗∗] are determined in a voting process.
6 The individually optimal immigration quotas
In this Section we characterize the voting behaviour of the natives.
In the introduction we brieﬂy surveyed the vast literature proving that non-
economic considerations matter in decisions over immigration. Another common
ﬁnding is that skilled voters are less averse to immigration (see, among others,
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Mayda, 2006). Moreover, some authors ﬁnd not
only that preferences over immigration depend on the skill level, but also that
immigration aversion is smaller towards skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and
Hiscox, 2007)13.
The present model takes these ﬁndings into account in the simplest possible
way by assuming that skilled and unskilled voters assign diﬀerent disutilities to
diﬀerent immigrants. Consequently, it is possible to ﬁt any hypothesis on the
relative weight of immigration aversion.
Summarizing, we can write the utilities as follows:
QS = [FS + FKk](1 − t(S,U))










      
immigration aversion
(16)
QU = FU(1 − t(S,U))










      
immigration aversion
(17)
13Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) use the European Social Survey, a questionnaire with the
crucial advantage that separate questions are asked about speciﬁc categories of immigrants
with diﬀerent skill characteristics. They ﬁnd that respondents are more open to immigration
from richer, well educated countries.
9QS and QU are, respectively, the utility of skilled and unskilled voters. The
ﬁrst term on the RHS of (16) and (17) is the net income, while the second
term summarizes the immigration aversion. γS,γU ≥ 0 depict the aversion to
unskilled immigration for skilled and unskilled natives respectively, and δS,δU ≥
0 do so for skilled immigration14.
Utilities (16) and (17) determine the voting behaviour. We use the procedure
proposed by Shepsle (1979) in order to ﬁnd out the result of the vote.
This procedure is widely used to solve multidimensional voting problems.
It assumes that the decision over S and U is simultaneous, thus simplifying
the problem to the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this model,
therefore, a vote is cast on S given U, and on U given S. The single-dimension
CWs mirror two reaction functions; if they exist and have a ﬁxed point, the
procedure has an equilibrium.
By applying the Weierstrass Theorem to (16) and (17) we know that along
each dimension there exists an optimal quota for any voter. This is suﬃcient to
move directly to Section 7, dedicated to the solution of the voting problem.
However, studying when voters prefer corner solutions or interior solutions is
useful to understand how immigration aversion contributes to restrict the entry
of a complementary factor. It is also useful to understand why the support
of a coalition is crucial to determine a CW. Thus, before applying the Shepsle
procedure, we characterize the individual voting behaviour in each dimension
by studying some properties of (16) and (17).
6.1 Skilled voters: choice of a quota for skilled workers
We are now going to consider the optimal choice of S (for a given U) of a skilled
voter. Utility (16) is deﬁned on the interval [0,SO].
Obviously, the desired immigration level depends on the capital endowment
k: skilled immigration reduces skilled wages but increases the capital income.
Unfortunately, maximizing (16) with respect to S and U respectively does not
yield closed-form solutions. As a consequence it is not possible to ﬁnd the
utility-maximizing immigration levels and to classify them with respect to the
capital endowment15. Nonethelss, by studying the derivative
∂QS
∂S at S = 0 and
S = SO, it is possible to show that for any U we can ﬁnd a capital endowment
k0 such that utility is increasing at S = 0 and a capital endowment kSO such
that utility is decreasing at S = SO. If kSO ≥ k0, interior solutions exist by
continuity. If kSO < k0, only corner solutions exist. This result is summarized
in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 (Optimal S for the skilled voters): consider the capital endow-
14In the case that there is no diﬀerence in the perception of skilled and unskilled immigra-
tion, we have simply γS = δS and γU = δU.
15Moreover, since there may be a corner solution for some voters, we do not know whether
the ﬁrst-order condition equals zero, and we cannot apply the Implicit Function Theorem.
10ments k0, kSO, given respectively by
k0 ≡
FStS(0,U) − FSS(1 − t(0,U))
FKS(1 − t(0,U)) − FKtS(0,U)
kSO ≡
δSSO + FStS(SO,U) − FSS(1 − t(SO,U))
FKS(1 − t(SO,U)) − FKtS(SO,U)
then,
(a) if kSO ≥ k0, votes are dispersed:
for any k ≤ k0, we have S∗
S(U) = 0 ;
for any k ∈ (k0,kSO], we have S∗
S(U) ∈ (0,SO);
for any k > kSO, we have S∗
S(U) = SO
(b) if k0 > kSO, votes are polarized:
for any k ≤ kSO, we have S∗
S(U) = 0
for any k > k0, we have S∗
S(U) = SO
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Proposition speciﬁes when skilled voters choose interior solutions or
corner solutions with respect to the entry of the competing factor for any level
of U.
In a neighborhood of S = 0 the derivative
∂QS
∂S is simply the marginal eﬀect
of skilled immigration on net income (immigration aversion is negligible around
S = 0). Therefore, any k ≤ k0 votes for complete border closure.
Interestingly, when k0 ≤ 0 nobody chooses a corner solution with no skilled
immigration. This happens when the marginal tax needed to enforce S = 0 is
suﬃciently high, a likely case for countries with costly border monitoring. Hence
the cost of sealing the border helps therefore to understand why complete closure
is a rare event.
Notice also. that the eﬀect of immigration aversion emerges as immigration
grows: δS contributes to increase the capital endowment kSO beyond the level
needed to oﬀset the loss in labour income.
6.2 Skilled voters: choice of a quota for unskilled workers
In the case of unskilled immigration, both labour income and capital income
increase as unskilled workers enter D, thus in this model any possible solution
U∗
S(S) < UO is due to the eﬀect of immigration aversion. Since closed-form
11solutions are not available, we still study the derivative
∂QS
∂U at U = 0 and at
U = UO for a given S. Again, utility is increasing around U = 0, because the
net skilled income grows with unskilled immigration, and immigration aversion
is negligible. As U → UO, it is possible to compute the capital endowment
suﬃcient to overcome the immigration aversion.
Proposition 3 (optimal U for the skilled voters): consider the capital endow-
ment kUO, given by
kUO ≡
γSUO + FStU(S,UO) − FSU(1 − t(S,UO))
FKU(1 − t(S,UO)) − FKtU(S,UO)
;
then,
(a′) if kUO > 0 votes are dispersed:
for any k ≤ kUO, we have U∗
S(S) ∈ (0,UO);
for any k > kUO, we have U∗
S(S) = UO
(b′) if kUO ≤ 0 voters decide unanimously:
for any k > 0, we have U∗
S(S) = UO
It is important to remark that the only positive term in the numerator of
kUO is γSUO. If immigration aversion (i.e. γS) is small enough we have kUO < 0
and therefore, open unskilled immigration.
This outcome shows that the economic incentive to throw open the doors
to unskilled workers is powerful. Immigration aversion therefore, seems quite
relevant to explain the increasing border closure.
However, in the model it is not shown that immigrants may increase the
cost of social security transfers. Thus one may argue that the result overstates
to a certain extent the net gains from immigration and, as a consequence, the
importance of immigration aversion. On the other hand, immigration can also
sustain the welfare state in the long run. The likely conclusion is that, for given
ﬁscal concerns, immigration aversion can be crucial in tilting the balance in
favour of restriction16.
6.3 Unskilled voters: choice of a quota for skilled workers
Since unskilled voters are homogeneous, they decide unanimously. Their optimal
choice is given by S∗(U). In analysing their behaviour, it is still important to
16Heinmueller and Hiscox (2007) ﬁnd that immigration aversion towards unskilled immi-
grants is higher.
12remember that there are no closed-form solutions when we maximize (17) with
respect to S and U. Notice that, since the unskilled income increases with
skilled immigration, any restriction must come from the immigration aversion
δU. For a given U, the level of δU needed to get an interior solution is found
again by studying the derivative of (17) at S = SO. The outcome is summarized
in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 (Optimal S for the unskilled voters): S∗(U) ∈ (0,SO) if δU >
FUS(1−t(SO,U)−tS(SO,U)FU
SO ; otherwise S∗(U) = SO.
Proof. See the Appendix.
According to this Proposition, immigration aversion is very inﬂuential in
reducing the desired inﬂow of skilled workers below SO. This result has an
interesting implication: in asmuch as skilled immigration is less likely to bear
on the public budget, the eﬀect of immigration aversion can be disentagled
from ﬁscal concerns. This outcome provides an interesting avenue for applied
research.
6.4 Unskilled voters: choice of a quota for unskilled work-
ers
In the next Proposition we characterize the optimal decision of the unskilled
natives with respect to the immigration of the competing factor for any level of
S. Since [FUU(1 − t(S,U)) − γUU] is the marginal loss due to unskilled immi-
gration and tU(S,U)FU is the marginal beneﬁt due to a relaxed enforcement,
we can write
Proposition 5 (Optimal U for the unskilled voters): U∗(S) ∈ (0,UO) when
|tU(S,0)FU| > |FUU(1 − t(S,0))| and γU >
FUU(1−t(S,UO))−tU(S,UO)FU
UO . Other-
wise, U∗(S) ∈ {0,UO}.
Proof. See the Appendix
The result reported in this Proposition is intuitively appealing17: if the
marginal tax reduction dominates the marginal wage loss in a neighborhood of
U = 0, some openness to the competing factor is convenient. Such an outcome
is not unlikely since enforcing zero immigration implies a high marginal cost
and immigration aversion is negligible for small values of U. The situation is
reversed if U = UO: the tax reduction is negligible, whereas wage competition
and disutility from immigration are maximised. Corner solutions emerge either
when the marginal cost of border enforcement never oﬀsets the marginal gain,
(U∗(S) = 0), or when the former always exceeds the latter (U∗(S) = UO).
17Interestingly, a similar outcome is reported by Mayr (2007) in a quite diﬀerent framework.
137 The Shepsle procedure
We now investigate the possibility of obtaining a selective immigration policy
from pairwise voting over S and U. It is assumed that only natives are granted
voting rights. Since the majority can be either skilled or unskilled, the two cases
will be analysed separately. In order to apply the Shepsle procedure, there must
exist an alternative able to defeat any other policy in a pairwise contest along
each dimension; then these single-dimension CWs must have a ﬁxed point. In
aggregating the individual preferences, the main issue will be proving that the
single-dimension CWs exist.
In what follows, we ﬁrst characterize the conditions under which there exists
a CW for S and U; we then specify the equilibrium of the bidimensional voting.
It is quite helpful to remark that utility (16) describes single-crossing pref-
erences, as it is stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 6 The preferences described by (16) are single-crossing over S and U.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Though single-crossing preferences usually allow us to apply the median
voter theorem, this is not true in the present model, as is argued in Lemma
7. Nonetheless, the single-crossing property determines regular aggregate be-
haviour of the skilled voters, and makes possible to ﬁnd out the conditions under
which a CW exists.
7.1 Single-dimension CWs: skilled majority
To simplify the results, in this Section we skip the case in which votes are
polarized. This case is examined in the appendix18.
In order to proceed with our analysis, it is useful to introduce the following
Lemma:
Lemma 7 The median voter’s choice is not a CW, neither for S, nor for U .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, suppose that a skilled median voter19 prefers an interior solution
for skilled immigration. Suppose also that some capital-rich skilled voters prefer
open skilled immigration (see Prop. 2). The median voter theorem breaks
down here because agents with no capital to the left of the median voter (i.e.
unskilled voters), whose income is increasing with skilled immigration, may
support capital-rich agents to the right of the median voter.
We therefore need an alternative criterion in order to single out a CW.
First of all, it is crucial to notice that skilled voters alone cannot ﬁnd a
CW even though they are the majority, and a coalition with unskilled voters is
always required. This is stated in the following Lemma:
18When votes are polarized a bidimensional CW may exist even without a coalition.
19Since we are in the case of a skilled majority, the median voter must be a skilled worker.
14Lemma 8 Even though skilled voters are the majority, any possible CW must
be supported by a coalition of skilled and unskilled voters.
Proof. See the appendix.
To see the intuition of this Lemma, consider that unskilled voters decide
unanimously, whereas skilled voters disagree on the optimal value of S20. Lemma
6 implies that one half skilled voters support the choice corresponding to the
median capital versus any other alternative. Since 1/2 skilled voters never form
a majority, the support of the unskilled voters is essential even though they are
a minority.
This has the crucial consequence that unskilled voters are pivotal, as is
stressed in Remark 10. For now, we want now to know whether the set of
possible single-dimension CWs is nonempty. This is done in the next Lemma:
Lemma 9 In a vote over S, there exist an interval [S1,S2] ⊆ [0,SO] such that
any S ∈ [S1,S2] can be supported by a majority coalition of skilled and unskilled
voters versus any other alternative. Analogously, in a vote over U, there exist
an interval [U1,U2] ⊆ [0,UO] such that any U ∈ [U1,U2] can be supported by
a majority coalition of skilled and unskilled voters versus any other alternative.
Any possible CW must lie in these intervals.
Proof. See the appendix.
The Lemma above states that along each dimension there exists a subset of
[0,SO] and a subset of [0,UO] whose elements satisfy the properties of a CW.
To understand why a majority coalition can be aggregated only on a subset of
the possible alternatives, consider the following example: let S∗ be any solution
chosen by the unskilled voters. Since skilled votes are dispersed on [0,SO], there
must exist k∗ such that S∗
S = S∗.
By Lemma 6, skilled voters to the left of k∗ support S∗ versus S′ > S∗, and
skilled voters to the right of k∗ support S∗ versus S′′ < S∗. If S∗ were too high,
it would be defeated by S′′ < S∗; if it were too small, it would be defeated by
S′ < S∗. The reasoning for U∗(S) is analogous.
Since each dimension admits a subset of possible CWs given by [S1,S2] and
[U1,U2], we want to know whether an alternative in these subsets is actually
picked up. In order to do so, the next Remark clariﬁes that unskilled voters are
pivotal in the choice between the alternatives supported by a coalition.
Remark 10 Unskilled voters are pivotal in the choice between any pair {Sα,Sβ} ∈
[S1,S2] and any pair {Uα,Uβ} ∈ [U1,U2].
This Remark is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 8: since no CW
exists without the support of the unskilled voters, it follows that they are decisive
20Lemma 8 -and, generally, the results of the model- do not depend on the simplifying
assumption that unskilled voters own no capital. What matters is that labour income is
increasing is S and decreasing in U for the unskilled voters, whereas the opposite occurs for
the skilled voters. Endowing unskilled voters with capital makes the algebra more cumbersome
without signiﬁcant gains in generality.
15within the coalition. As a consequence, unskilled voters will pick up a CW when
their preferred alternative lies on these intervals. Intuitively, this only happens
in a subset of the domains of S∗(U) and U∗(S).
Proposition 11 (Existence of the single-dimensions CWs with skilled major-
ity): consider the unskilled voters’ optimal quotas S∗(U) and U∗(S). S∗(U) is
a single-dimension CW for any U ∈ [Ua,Ub] ⊆ [0,UO]. U∗(S) is a single-
dimension CW for any S ∈ [Sa,Sb] ⊆ [0,SO]
Proof. See the appendix.
For given S∗(U), U∗(S), the proposition simply deﬁnes the subsets of their
domains that produce a single-dimension CW. These subsets are deﬁned in the
Appendix.
Clearly, this establishes important restrictions for the existence of a CW of
bidimensional voting. This issue is discussed in the next Section.
7.2 Single-dimension CWs: unskilled majority
Unskilled voters are homogeneous because they own no capital. Therefore, they
decide unanimously. When they are the majority, ﬁnding the CWs is trivial.
This is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 12 (Existence of the single-dimension CWs with unskilled ma-
jority): the unskilled voters’ optimal quotas S∗(U) and U∗(S) are the single-
dimension CWs.
Proof. See the appendix.
In this case, the single-dimension CWs exist under very general conditions.
It is interesting to recall that skilled immigration will be restricted only if
immigration aversion is high enough (see Prop. 4). On the contrary, some un-
skilled immigration will be approved only if the marginal cost of enforcing the
border dominates the marginal wage beneﬁt at U = 0 (see Prop. 5). There-
fore, the quotas chosen by unskilled majorities should be biased towards skilled
immigrants. This suggests that selective immigration policies biased towards
skilled workers can easily emerge from an unskilled majority (provided that an
equilibrium of the Shepsle procedure exists).
However, as was argued in the Introduction, unskilled voters are a minority
in the countries adopting selective policies. Nonetheless, since they are pivotal,
they are still able to bias policy towards their preferred outcome.
7.3 The Shepsle procedure equilibrium
So far, we have discussed the existence of a CW in each dimension with skilled
and unskilled majorities respectively. Now we want to know whether the Shepsle
procedure admits an equilibrium (i.e. a ﬁxed point). Since unskilled voters are
pivotal, the result of the Shepsle procedure can be summarized as follows:
16Proposition 13 (Shepsle procedure equilibrium): the unskilled voters’ optimal
quotas S∗(U) and U∗(S) generate always at least an equilibrium of the Shepsle
procedure given by the pair (S∗∗,U∗∗). When the majority is unskilled, any pair
(S∗∗,U∗∗) is a CW of the bidimensional voting. When the majority is skilled,
a pair (S∗∗,U∗∗) is a CW of the bidimensional voting only if S∗∗ ∈ [S1,S2] and
U∗∗ ∈ [U1,U2].
Proof. See the Appendix.
According to this Proposition, the Shepsle procedure always gives an equi-
librium given by S∗∗(U), U∗∗(S). However, when the majority is skilled the
existence of a "global" CW requires that this point lies on the intervals sup-
ported by a coalition.
The model is therefore able to generate a selective immigration policy. But
in the most relevant case restrictive conditions are needed for the existence of
a CW in bidimensional voting. Acknowledgement of this problem is common
in the literature: aggregating heterogeneous preferences requires always strong
assumptions in order to avoid voting cycles.
Nonetheless, it is also well known that real-world voting outcomes are much
more stable than theory predicts (see the classical contribution of Tullock, 1981).
Selective immigration policies are indeed used in countries like Canada, Aus-
tralia, the UK, the US.
The solution to the stability puzzle is also well known: in representative
democracies, institutional arrangements and parliamentary procedures make the
selection of a CW more likely than direct democracy.
According to Shepsle and Weingast (2010), "institutions constrain behaviour
in ways that prevent endless voting cycles even in the presence of cyclical pref-
erences".
Procedures induce voting stability mainly by restricting the domain of the
alternatives, for example by ﬁxing the agenda setting rules (Romer and Rosen-
thal, 1978) or by allocating the plenary time (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). In
this paper voting cycles might arise because unskilled voters could prefer an
alternative lying outside the intervals supported by a coalition. In such a sit-
uation, any institution or procedure able to restrict the domain of the vote to
the intervals [S1,S2], [U1,U2] would always generate a CW. This task is usually
carried out by parliamentary routines, which, unfortunately, do not emerge in
the direct-democracy framework of this paper21.
A property of the model is that diﬀerent voting outcomes are possible, de-
pending on whether the majority is skilled or unskilled, on the weight of im-
migration aversion, on the cost of border enforcement. In practice however,
selective policies are explicitly aimed to restrict unskilled immigration more
than they do for skilled immigration.
21Immigration restrictions can be studied also as the result of lobbying activities from
diﬀerent interest groups (see Mazza and Van Winden, 1996; Goldin, 1994; Epstein and Nitzan,
2006). In Amegashie (2004) a ﬁrm and a union compete in a lobbying contest to determine
the immigration quota. A democratic government may bias its decisions to a certain extent,
but it cannot reverse the preferences of its voters. For this reason, the lobbying approach is
complementary to the model developed in this paper in explaining selective policies.
17Such an outcome corresponds to the case of a coalition where unskilled vot-
ers are pivotal and they are successful in biasing the ﬁnal choice to their own
advantage despite the fact that they are in the minority.
We have therefore a plausible solution to the puzzle outlined in the intro-
duction: why skilled, well-educated societies are closed to unskilled workers and
why selective policies are biased towards skilled immigration.
Interestingly, unskilled voters cannot set skilled immigration at their own
will, even though they are decisive: for example, the size of the coalition sup-
porting S∗(U) = SO could be too small, because skilled workers with little
capital would never support such an outcome22.
The last remark leads us to wonder how the capital distribution n(k) aﬀects
the range of the possible CWs. The width of [S1,S2] and of [U1,U2] is deter-
mined by n(k) and by the weight of the unskilled workers on the population.
This eﬀect is summarized in the following Remark:
Remark 14 (Range of the possible CWs): the intervals [S1,S2], [U1,U2] shift
according to the skewness of n(k) and to the share of unskilled voters in the total
population.
Proof. See the appendix.
According to this Remark, the role of n(k) is crucial in determining the
subsets containing the CW.
In this respect, we know that capital distribution is even more concentrated
than income distribution: while Gini indexes for the latter range from 0.3 to
0.5, ﬁgures for wealth concentration are 0.6-0.8 23(Davies et al., 2011.; see also
Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008).
This ﬁnding is very important: it implies that the range of the possible CWs
is biased downwards, because most voters do not own enough capital to get a
net beneﬁt from skilled immigration. Notice however, that if unskilled workers
are an important share of the population, they need the support of few skilled
voters to form a majority. This, in turn, widens the intervals [S1,S2], [U1,U2].
The ﬁnal range of these intervals -thus the potential openness to immigration-
depends on which eﬀect prevails.
Actual selective policies seem compatible with a scenario in which unskilled
voters bias the ﬁnal outcome, but where skilled voters are still able to impose
some protection.
This supposition is conﬁrmed by the observation that barriers to entry are
decreasing with respect to skills, but that skilled immigration is far from being
open. This supports the conjecture that gains from immigration accruing to
capital income beneﬁt only a tiny minority. The available Gini indexes24 are
22Immigration aversion is more important to explain restrictions for unskilled immigration:
skilled majorities do not need to form any coalition if γS = 0 and U∗(S) = UO.
23In the model, capital is a physical asset. As such, it is included in the deﬁnition of
wealth adopted in Davies et al. (2011). Therefore, to conjecture that the capital distribution
coincides with the wealth distribution is a good approximation.
24According to Davies et al. (2011) the values are 0.69 (Canada); 0.622 (Australia); 0.7
(UK); 0.81 (US).
18consistent with this hypothesis25.
8 Conclusions
This paper has developed a model of voting over selective immigration policies
within a three-factor, two-country model.
Particular attention has been paid to both the eﬀects on capital income,
and the eﬀect of aversion to immigration, whose importance in the literature
seems underplayed given the empirical evidence. Heterogeneity in the capital
distribution enables unskilled natives with a decisive vote to reduce protection
for the skilled majority. Immigration aversion however, seems useful to explain
why skilled majorities restrict the entry of a complementary factor. From an
economic point of view protectionism against unskilled immigrants is more dif-
ﬁcult to explain than protectionism against skilled immigrants. Fiscal concerns
alone seem insuﬃcient to account for this outcome, since immigration has op-
posing eﬀects on the public budget: it can be a burden in the short run, but it
supports the welfare state in the long run. Moreover, sealing the border entails
signiﬁcant costs for many countries. As a consequence it seems likely that, in
the presence of uncertainty on the net ﬁscal eﬀect of immigration, immigration
aversion is crucial in tipping the scales in favour of restriction.
The model contributes to the literature by explaining why protection for
skilled voters is less prevalent than one would expect: unskilled voters take
advantage of a decisive voting power even though they are in the minority, and
they bias the ﬁnal choice in their favour. Skewness in the capital distribution
however, is likely to reduce the extent of both skilled and unskilled immigration
liberalization.
In other words, while gains from trade can be easily acquired via lower prices,
gains from immigration via capital income beneﬁt only a tiny fraction of capital
owners. Since wealth concentration is a structural characteristic of the world’s
economies, the possibility of reducing the barriers to immigration appears quite
unlikely in the near future.
In conclusion, selective policies can be considered as a clever form of selective
protectionism: entry is easier only for highly skilled individuals in speciﬁc sec-
tors of the economy26. Openness to the most qualiﬁed workers is often presented
as necessary to boost economic growth. The implicit assumption is that import-
ing only the highest skills allows gains in productivity that beneﬁt the whole
economy. A policy able to deliver such beneﬁts would be adopted unanimously.
In practice, technological innovations of this extent are not frequent. How-
ever, the outcome of the model is not at odds with this idea, provided that
25By using the 1998-2007 inﬂow/population rate (Source: OECD, 2008) as a rough measure
of openness to immigration, we get the following ranking: Canada: 0.0075; Australia: 0.007;
UK: 0.0056; US: 0.0032. According to these ﬁgures, inﬂows per capita are higher in Canada
and Australia, where wealth concentration is smaller.
26In some respects, these results complement the ﬁndings of Hillman and Weiss (1999), who
argue that selective enforcement of immigration restrictions -hence selective illegality- is a
form of protectionism to divert labour inﬂows into sectors where they beneﬁt the natives.
19the skilled quota includes the most qualiﬁed immigrants. Obviously, a proper
analysis of this issue requires a dynamic endogenous growth framework. This ex-
tension is a promising subject for future research. For the moment, the model
presented sheds some light on the inconsistency of the selective immigration
policies.
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24Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Existence:
Here we rewrite the system of inequalities in (15):

    
    
FS [(SD + S∗),(UD + U∗),K](1 − t(S∗,U∗) ≥ θSGS [(SO − S),(UO − U)]
(15 − 1) -skilled
FU [(SD + S∗),(UD + U∗),K](1 − t(S∗,U∗) ≥ θUGU [(SO − S),(UO − U)]
(15 − 2) -unskilled
we ﬁrst consider the case of no immigration quotas. We want to know whether
the system of inequalities (15) admits a solution. The production functions F
and G are strictly concave, invertible27, and diﬀerentiable in all their arguments.
The marginal productivities are also diﬀerentiable and invertible in all their
arguments. Now we assume that, in the absence of any migration, the net
wage is higher in D both for skilled and unskilled workers (assumption AA).
This implies that the Left Hand Side dominates the Right Hand Side in S = 0
for ineq. (15 − 1) and that the LHS dominates the RHS in U = 0 for ineq.
(15 − 2)28.
We explore the existence of a unique solution to (15 − 1). The RHS of
(15 − 1) is increasing in S: the marginal productivity of skilled work in O in-
creases as skilled workers migrate.
The slope of the LHS instead is
∂LHS
∂S
= FSS(.,.,.)(1 − t(S,U))
      
a
− FS(.,.,.)tS(S,U)
      
b
where a < 0 is the decreasing marginal productivity, and b < 0 is the marginal
tax (decreasing in S). The slope of the LHS depends on the diﬀerence between
a and b. By Assumption (10) we know that ∂LHS
∂S < 0 at S = SO. On the
other hand, if the marginal tax is suﬃciently high at S = 0, it is possible that
∂LHS
∂S > 0 in a neighborhood of 0. This could cause multiple solutions, as shown
in the ﬁgure below:
27Thus, given any production level ˜ F = F(˜ S, ˜ U, ˜ K) it is always possible to obtain ˜ S =
a( ˜ F, ˜ K, ˜ U) , ˜ U = b( ˜ F, ˜ S, ˜ K) and ˜ K = c( ˜ F, ˜ S, ˜ U). The same holds for G(U,S), and for the
marginal productivities. This assumption is required in order to assure the local uniqueness
of ﬁxed points when whe apply the Brouwer Fixed-Point Theorem. Notice that standard
production functions like a CD or a CES satisfy this assumption.
28This assumption is needed in order to avoid multiple solutions, as we are goig to see in
what follows.
25Figure A.1: multiple solutions
Howevere, Assumption AA rules out case (1) and case (2) is not possible
because the derivative ∂LHS
∂S can equal zero at most once29. We conclude that
ˆ S(U) that satisﬁes ineq. (15 − 1) exists and is unique. Continuity of ˆ S(U)
follows from the invertibility of FS(S,U,K)(1−t(S,U)) and of GS(U,S)30. The
same reasoning proves that inequality (15 − 2) admits a unique solution ˆ U(S),
continuous in S.
Now, we have to prove that, given ˆ S(U) and ˆ U(S), it is possible to ﬁnd a
pair (ˆ SE, ˆ UE) such that ˆ S(ˆ UE) = ˆ SE, and ˆ U(ˆ SE) = ˆ UE. This pair exists when
the function Φ = ˆ U(ˆ S(ˆ U)) has a ﬁxed point.
Since ˆ S(U) and ˆ U(S) are continuous and their domain is compact, Φˆ U(ˆ S(ˆ U))
maps the compact interval [0,UO] continuously into itself, and existence is
proved by the Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem. We conclude that the system
of inequalities (15) admits at least a solution.
Now we have to prove that an equilibrium exists even in the presence of
quotas. We begin again with ineq. (15 − 1). A quota S∗∗ is binding whenever
S∗∗ < ˆ S(U). Since ˆ S(U) maps [0,UO] into [0,SO], the quota simply restricts
the codomain of ˆ S(U) to [0,S∗∗]. Thus when the quota is binding we can deﬁne
ˆ SQ(U), that maps [0,UO] continuously into [0,S∗∗].
The same holds for ˆ U(S): when the quota is binding, we can deﬁne ˆ UQ(S)
that maps [0,SO] continuously into [0,U∗∗], where U∗∗ < UO. We have to prove
that there exist a pair (ˆ SE
Q, ˆ UE
Q) such that ˆ SQ(ˆ UE
Q) = ˆ SE
Q, and ˆ UQ(ˆ SE
Q) = ˆ UE
Q.
This occurs when the function ΦQ = ˆ U(ˆ SQ(ˆ UQ)) has a ﬁxed point.
By construction, ΦQ = ˆ UQ(ˆ SQ(ˆ UQ)) maps continuously [0,UO] into [0,U∗∗].
Since [0,U∗∗] ⊆ [0,UO], it is still possible to apply the Brouwer’s ﬁxed-point
theorem (see, for example, Ortega and Rheinboldt, 2000, page 161), and the
system of inequalities (15) admits at least a solution.
29Suppose that ∂LHS




(1−t(S,U)), which can be true at
most once, since both members are negative and increasing.
30FS(S,U,K)(1 − t(S,U)) is the product of two functions invertible with respect to S and
U. This product is also invertible. Thus, the intersection of FS(S,U,K)(1 − t(S,U)) and
GS(S,U) moves smoothly as U changes. Notice that this also ensures that "jumps" of ˆ S(U)
are not possible in a neighborhood of a corner solution.
26Local Uniqueness
we begin with the case in which quotas are not binding. In order for the
solution ˆ S(ˆ UE) = ˆ SE, ˆ U(ˆ SE) = ˆ UE to be locally unique, we need that there
does not exist an interval where the functions ˆ S(U) and ˆ U(S) overlap. This
is true when they are analytic (i.e., they can be developed in a convergent
Taylor series in any point of their domain). Notice that any standard, smooth,
production function (like a C-D or a CES) and its derivatives are analytic.
By strict concavity, the second derivative of the production function is always
negative. Therefore, ˆ S(U) and ˆ U(S) are obtained by inverting an analytic
marginal productivity with a nonzero derivative. Since the inverse of an analytic
function with a nonzero derivative is analytic, it follows that ˆ S(U) and ˆ U(S)
are analytic.
When only a quota is binding, any solution is locally unique: the quota is a
straight line, thus it is still an analytic function. When both quotas are binding,
only the solution (S∗∗,U∗∗) exists.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the derivative of (16) with respect to S:
∂QS
∂S
= [FSS + kFKS](1 − t(S,U)) − tS(S,U)[FS + kFK] − δSS (18)
at S = 0 it is possible to solve the inequality
∂QS
∂S > 0 with respect to k: this
gives k0. kSO is obtained by solving
∂QS
∂S < 0 with respect to k at S = SO.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the derivative of (16) with respect to U:
∂QS
∂U
= [FSU + kFKU](1 − t(S,U)) − tU(S,U)[FU + kFK] − γSU (19)
it is easy to check that, at U = 0,
∂QS
∂U > 0. kUO is obtained by solving
∂QS
∂U < 0
with respect to k at U = UO.
Proof of Proposition 4





= FUS(1 − t(S,U)) − tS(S,U)FU − δUS (20)
Since
∂QU
∂S is always positive at S = 0, to have interior solutions we only need
that
∂QU
∂S < 0 at S = SO. Therefore, it is immediate to obtain
δU >
FUS(1 − t(SO,U)) − tS(SO,U)FU
SO
.
Proof of Proposition 5
27Consider the derivative of the utility:
∂QU
∂U
= FUU(1 − t(S,U)) − tU(S,U)FU − γUU (21)
FUU(1−t(S,U)) is the marginal wage loss due to labour market competition,
and tU(S,U)FU is the marginal ﬁscal beneﬁt due to relaxed border enforcement.
Notice that, in a neighborhood of U = 0, the marginal tax is highest and
(marginal) immigration aversion is negligible: the ﬁnal result depends only on
the net marginal wage eﬀect. In a neighborhood of U = UO the situation is
reversed when
γU >
FUU(1 − t(S,UO)) − tU(S,UO)FU
UO
.
Proof of Lemma 6
We need to prove that the preferences of skilled workers are single-crossing
along both dimensions (S,U). That can be done by applying the deﬁnition:
preferences QS exhibit the single-crossing property with respect to S if we can
order the voters from left to right according to their capital endowment and,
given S′ > S
′′
and k′ > k
′′
, we have:
if QS(k′′,S′) ≥ QS(k′′,S′′) (α) then QS(k′,S′) ≥ QS(k′,S′′) (α′)
and
if QS (k′,S′′) ≥ QS (k′,S′) (β) then QS (k′′,S′′) ≥ QS (k′′,S′) (β′)
We can rearrange condition (α) as follows (omitting for simplicity the argu-
ments other than S):
k′′ [FK(S′)(1 − t(S′)) − FK(S′′)(1 − t(S′′))] ≥
≥ FS(S′′)(1 − t(S′′)) − FS(S′)(1 − t(S′)) + δS(S′ − S′′) (22)
since k′′ < k′, it follows that (α) implies (α′). Now, we rearrange condition (β)
as well:
FS(S′′)(1 − t(S′′)) − FS(S′)(1 − t(S′)) + δS(S′ − S′′) ≥
≥ k′ [FK(S′)(1 − t(S′)) − FK(S′′)(1 − t(S′′))] (23)
again, since k′ > k′′, (β) implies (β′).
Now we have to prove that preferences are single-crossing with respect to U.
Conditions (α) and (β) are the same, but we consider now U′ > U′′ instead of
S′ > S′′. We rearrange condition (α), and we obtain
k′′[FK(U′)(1 − t(U′)) − FK(U′′)(1 − t(U′′))]+





28Notice that the coeﬃcient of k′′ is negative, therefore, since k′ > k′′, (α)
implies (α′). Condition (β) can be written as
γS(U
′2 − U
′′2) ≥ [FS(U′)(1 − t(U′)) − FS(U′′)(1 − t(U′′))]+
+k′[FK(U′)(1 − t(U′)) − FK(U′′)(1 − t(U′′))]
again, since k′ > k′′, (β) implies (β′). We conclude that the preferences de-
scribed by QS are single crossing along S and U.
Proof of Lemma 7
We are in the case of a skilled majority, thus the median voter is skilled.
Unskilled voters, who are not endowed with capital, lie on the left of the median
voter. Suppose that the median voter’s capital endowment is such that she
chooses an interior solution S∗
SM ∈ (0,SO). By Prop. 2, voters endowed with
k > kSO choose the corner solution S∗
S = SO. By Prop. 4, unskilled voters also
choose S∗ = SO when δU is suﬃciently low. As a consequence, it is not true that
all voters to the left of the median voter support S∗
M versus SO. In general, there





the median voter theorem cannot be applied.
Proof of Lemma 8
We want to prove that, when the vote is not polarized, a majority of skilled
voters cannot single out a CW without a coalition with the unskilled voters.
In the destination country there are SD skilled voters. Suppose they ac-
count for 70% of the total population. To form a skilled majority of the total
population, it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd z such that 0.7z > 1/2.
In this example, we need z > 0.715. The crucial remark is that, until there
exist at least an unskilled voter, it must be z > 1/2, i.e. more than one half
skilled voters are needed to support a winner.
Consider now an alternative SA. Since votes are dispersed, we know that
there exist kA such that the optimal choice of the voter endowed with kA is SA.





n(k)dk. Analogously, SA is supported versus S′′ < SA by
  ¯ k
kA n(k)dk
skilled voters. For SA being a CW, we need that SA has a majority both versus







≥ z (SA defeats S′ > SA)
2) :
  ¯ k
kA n(k)dk
SD
≥ z (SA defeats S′′ < SA)

















SD > 1, a contradiction. The same reasoning holds for the decision over U.
Proof of Lemma 9
The Lemma is concerned with the case of a skilled majority when votes are
dispersed (Prop. 2, case (a)). By Lemma 8, we know that any CW needs the
support of the unskilled voters. Consider again an alternative SA. By Lemma 8,




n(k)dk skilled voters versus S′ > SA, and by
  ¯ k
kA n(k)dk
skilled voters versus S′′ < SA.
For SA being a CW, it must be supported by a majority coalition versus S′ >









(SA defeats S′ > SA)
2′) :
UD +






(SA defeats S′′ < SA).
Remark now that at least one condition must hold with inequality. For example,
if unskilled voters are 30% of the total population, the smallest winning coalition
needs the support of only 28.5% skilled voters. If SA is supported by 28.5%
skilled voters versus S′ , it will be supported by 71.5% skilled voters versus S′′.
It follows that there exist a continuum of alternatives satisfying conditions 1’)
and 2’). Thus there exist an interval [S1,S2] of possible CWs31.
The lower bound (S1) and the upper bound (S2) can be found by computing
the values of k (say k1 and k2) such that both 1’) and 2’) hold with equality:
S1 is the choice of S for the capital endowment k1, and S2 is the choice of S for


















By construction, k2 ≥ k1. Given k2 ≥ k1, it is easy to see that S2 ≥ S1. In
case of interior solutions, since S1 and S2 are the optimal choice for k1 and k2
respectively, they satisfy
∂QS
∂S = 0, i.e.
k[FKS(1−t(S,U))−tS(S,U)FK]−tS(S,U)FS = δSS −FSS(1−t(S,U)) (25)
Where the LHS of (25) is the marginal gain and the RHS is the marginal loss.
Both the LHS and the RHS are increasing in S, and k rescales the LHS. As a
31In the boundary case of a single unskilled voter, [S1,S2] is reduced to a point coinciding
with the choice of the individual endowed with the median capital.
30consequence, the value of S that equals the marginal gain and the marginal loss
must be increasing in k. In the case of corner solutions, if k2 chooses S2 = S0,
it must be S1 ≤ S2; if k2 chooses S2 = 0, it must be S1 = S2 = 0. The interval
[U1,U2] is determined by the same procedure.
Proof of Proposition 11
Consider utility (17) for a given U. Eq. (17) is a continuous function deﬁned
on a compact domain, thus via the Weierstrass Theorem we know that the
optimal choice S∗(U) exist. According to the game-theoretical literature, it is
assumed that the global maximum of the reaction function S∗(U) is unique32.
Since eq. (17) is continuous in U, and [0,UO] is compact, the Theorem of the
Maximum holds, and we know that S∗(U) maps continuously the interval [0,UO]
into [0,SO]. Therefore, there must exist a subset [Ua,Ub] ⊂ [0,UO] such that
S∗(U) ∈ [S1.S2]. The same reasoning applies to the interval [Sa.Sb].
Proof of Proposition 12
Unskilled voters decide unanimously, thus S∗(U) and U∗(S) coincide with
the single-dimension CWs. The existence and continuity of S∗(U) and U∗(S)
are shown in the previous proof.
Proof of Proposition 13
By remark 10 we know that unskilled voters are pivotal for any choice be-
tween two alternatives included in [S1,S2], and in [U1,U2]33. In order to apply
the Shepsle procedure, S∗(U) and U∗(S) can be considered two "reaction func-
tions" deﬁned, respectively, over the compact intervals [0,UO] and [0,SO].
Consider ﬁrst S∗(U) : [0,UO] → [0,SO], then U∗(S) : [0,SO] → [0,UO].
Both S∗(U) and U∗(S) are continuous, and we adopt the standard assumption
that they are unique34. We build now the function   = S∗(U∗(S)) : [0,SO] →
[0,SO]. For an equilibrium to exist,   must have a ﬁxed point. Since   maps
continuously [0,SO] into itself, the Brouwer theorem applies, thus there exist
at least an equilibrium S∗∗, U∗∗ of the Shepsle procedure. This equilibrium is
always a CW of the bidimensional vote when the majority is unskilled. With
a skilled majority, a pair S∗∗, U∗∗ is a CW only if S∗∗ ∈ [S1,S2] and U∗∗ ∈
[U1,U2]. The "reaction functions" must intersect within the intervals supporting
a coalition35.
Proof of Remark 14
Suppose that the alternative supported by unskilled voters is SA. For SA
to defeat S′ > SA we need that conditions 1’) and 2’) hold. Consider condition
32In footnote 33 it is explained why this assumption is needed.
33See the second part of this Appendix to check the conditions for S∗(U) and U∗(S) to be
a CW when they lie on the boundary.
34Otherwise, the domain of   would not be convex. This assumption, usual in the literature,
restricts the existence to the case in which S∗(U) and U∗(S) are unique.
35This could be not necessary when the vote of a skilled majority is polarized, as it is










(SA defeats S′ > SA)
Consider now two distributions n(k) and n′(k), both continuous and deﬁned
over [k,  k]. Since the population size does not change, we have also
  ¯ k
k n(k)dk =
  ¯ k
k n′(k)dk = SD. Assume now that n′(k) is symmetrical, and n(k) is left-





Condition 1’) holds with equality for k1 < k′
1, and S1 < S′
1. By applying the
same reasoning to condition 2’) it is possible to prove that the upper bound S2
is lower for the left-skewed distribution n(k). The same applies to the interval
[U1,U2].
Part II: polarized vote with skilled majority
Voting over S: corner solutions.
According to Proposition 2, when k0 > kSO, we have S∗
S(U) = 0 for any
k ≤ kSO, and S∗
S(U) = SO for any k > kSO. In this case, a coalition of skilled
and unskilled voters might not be necessary to form a majority if enough skilled
voters choose the same solution, since the latter are more than half the popula-
tion.
If a solution -say SO- is chosen by a fraction y of the skilled voters, then,
when xy > 1/2, SO is a CW.
Voting over U: corner solutions.
According to Proposition 3, when kUO < 0, US(S)∗ = UO for any k. There-
fore, skilled voters decide unanimously, and US(S)∗ = UO is the CW. Again, no
coalition is needed.
The Bidimensional CW
In the case of corner solutions, a skilled majority chooses unskilled immigra-
tion unanimously, thus US(S)∗ = UO for any S. With respect to S∗
S(U), we have
two possibilities: either a coalition is not needed, or it is. In the ﬁrst case, the
bidimensional CWs are either (SO,UO) or (0,UO). When skilled voters cannot
decide alone, we go back to Proposition 13, remarking that [Sa,Sb] = [0,SO].
32